As a fresh attempt to kick start the Sri Lankan peace process takes shape, the future of this strife-torn island swings uncertainly between no war and new war. Formal talks between the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been stalled since 2003. After much dispute over a mutually acceptable venue, the two sides finally agreed on Geneva, and talks are set to take place on February 22-23, 2006. But both sides are looking at only a limited mandate for the upcoming talks. On the governmental side stands the clear agenda of reviewing the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and making it less prone to violations. The LTTE, on the other hand, has made it clear that it seeks a more complete implementation of the CFA and not its revision. Beyond this lie deeper issues such as the LTTE's demand for de-escalating the Sri Lankan's military presence in northern Jaffna peninsula. The Army's presence in the area undermines the Tigers' claim to the northeast as part of the larger aspiration for a Tamil homeland. This demand is also intrinsically related to the actual territorial control the LTTE wields in the northeast. Another issue pertains to disarming the "paramilitaries" in the eastern district. These 'paramilitaries' refer to the Karuna faction's shadow war against the Tigers. This stands as an unprecedented challenge to the LTTE leadership and has weakened its claim to be the sole representative of the Tamils.
Given these entrenched and asymmetric positions, there is not much scope for optimism. But the exercise of going back to the negotiating table does point to a greater willingness on the part of the new government in Colombo to engage in dialogue, and reflects the changing dynamics on the ground for the rebels.
A great deal of diplomatic activity has preceded the decision to meet at Geneva. The internationalization of the Sri Lankan conflict has witnessed the involvement of several interested parties and actors in the fate of the ethnic struggle. The international community has become a key player in the peace process, and it has sought to use aid as a tool for peace-building. While much disagreement raged over the disbursem*nt of Tsunami aid followed by the Post Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) fiasco, the fact remains that both the government and the LTTE have a stake in laying their hands on international aid which remains locked up. Besides, given the growing international isolation of the LTTE, it has found it difficult to avoid negotiations in the face of international pressure.
Domestically too, this fresh bid at peace is in keeping with President Rajapaksa's electoral promise to start a new peace initiative that is both transparent and inclusive. In keeping with his Mahinda Chintana or Vision, the new President has gone about forging a national consensus in favour of talks by convening an All Parties Conference meeting recently.
As far as India is concerned, despite Rajapaksa's open efforts urging a more direct Indian role as a Tokyo Conference Co-Chair during his December 2005 state visit to New Delhi, India has made clear its inability to be more active. Although the Sri Lankan peace process is of much significance, it is mainly through tools like military cooperation, economic aid, and negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) that the Indian government has maintained a policy of supporting the Sri Lankan government against the LTTE.
Another dimension that requires attention is that the US role has visibly increased in the peace process. In early January, Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera visited Washington and met Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice as well as the Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senator Richard Lugar. Foreign Minister Samaraweera reportedly requested the US to ban the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), which is the LTTE's main aid arm and is reputed to be a front organisation for fundraising from the Tamil Diaspora. Samaraweera also reiterated President Mahinda Rajapaksa's resolve to pursue a negotiated settlement, curb escalating tensions with the LTTE and forge a 'southern consensus' in the country. Later, US Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns visited Colombo. In what can be described as an unmistakable signal to the rebels to abandon violence, Burns described the LTTE as a "reprehensive terrorist group" which was responsible for keeping Sri Lanka on the edge of war. In an interesting statement that echoes New Delhi's long held view, Burns also drew a distinction between the grievances of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and that of the LTTE. He made explicit US support for ending violence, a return to negotiations and the maintenance and strengthening of the ceasefire agreement. Besides, Burns made it clear that the LTTE would not gain any support if it continued to follow the path of violence. The US has also taken steps to send a top-level team to Sri Lanka comprising agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to carry out a close study of the prevailing situation in the country and the activities of the Tigers.
On his part the LTTE supremo Prabhakaran, in his Heroes Day speech on November 27, 2005, made it clear that the Tigers would intensify their struggle for liberation unless the new government comes forward with a reasonable political framework within a year's time. This seems to be a reiteration of the LTTE's Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) demand, which was earlier rejected by the Chandrika Kumaratunga government.
The recent escalation in violence, as witnessed in the suspected Black Sea Tiger claymore attack on a convoy killing eight sailors of the Sri Lankan navy and the recent assault on a Fast Attack Craft (FAC) near Trincomalee harbour, has tested the government's resolve. According to Sri Lankan Army statistics, since December 2005 over 130 persons have been killed, including 77 from the security forces, 42 civilians and 15 LTTE cadres.
But it is clear that the government is not willing to be drawn into a military confrontation. It seeks instead a political solution that can be facilitated and made acceptable with the help of external agencies and actors. In this context, perhaps a federal solution could be adopted. The international community including India is actively encouraging an exploration of a federal solution. USAID recently held a Workshop in Colombo to popularise the federal idea. If a domestic political consensus can be reached, it will then be a matter of making the LTTE accept the same. This is something that everyone understands will be the long-term challenge.
The last round of talks at Hakone, Japan (March 2003) was a tame affair. The ppeace talks were dominated by the issue of the sinking of a LTTE ship by the Sri Lankan Navy in international waters. The issue of high security zones (HSZs) also figured in that round, with both sides arguing for and against the removal of HSZs. For the Tigers, the HSZs have posed a major hindrance to the resettlement of the displaced population; but the Government negotiators wanted to link demilitarization with a final political solution. Today, the issue of HSZs has been overshadowed by the Karuna factor, which seems to be not only a major irritant for the Tigers but also an unprecedented challenge.
At Geneva, the LTTE are to be represented by their chief ideologue Anton Balasingham, political wing leader S P Thamil Chelvam, `Police Chief` Nadesan, Ilanperiyan and Jeyam from Jaffna, with Adele Balasingham as secretary to the delegation. The government's negotiating team led by the Health Minister Nirmal Siripala de Silva is relatively inexperienced. A series of workshops have been launched to better equip the negotiators. Even the former negotiator of the Sinn Fein, Martin McGuiness met with President Rajapaksa to discuss whether the negotiation techniques employed in the Irish peace process could be employed in the Sri Lankan case. The new government, despite its hardline Sinhala nationalist allies, wants to project itself as a supporter of the fragile ceasefire. It reportedly seeks to tow a softer line, and be more accommodating. Despite its determination to revise the agreement, a concerted effort to return to talks implies a decision to stave off war and keep the negative peace of 'no war' alive.
While it's off to Geneva for now, the room for optimism is low. Consistent pressure from the international community has been a prime reason for resumption of talks. However, unless both sides agree to significantly shift their stands, the talks would essentially prove to be a time buying tactic for the Tigers.
In the last month tensions had mounted in Nigeria's oil rich Delta region due to the kidnapping of four expatriate oil workers and attacks by militant youths at two oil flow stations at Bayelsa state, owned by the energy giant Shell. The violence caused a shock in the Delta. Shell had to evacuate 326 staff and contract workers from four remote oil facilities and shut down production of 211, 000 barrels per day in the western Delta region. This move had led to price increase in the already jumpy oil market. There were also apprehensions that a bloody crackdown may spark a broader wave of violence in the restive region and could lead to a return to the dark days of 2003, when clashes between soldiers and rival ethnic groups left hundreds dead and thousands homeless.
Though at the moment tensions have been relieved with the release of hostages by the militants, the situation still remains tense. The demands of the militants for the release of Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, a militia leader from the region facing treason charges, has not yet been met. The militant group Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, which claims to have 5,000 warriors, aims to cripple Shell's activities in the area and destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export. Given this situation one cannot dismiss the likelihood of further violent attacks in the Delta.
Delta is an unstable area of Nigeria and often access to oil revenue is the trigger for the violence. Low-level conflict among security forces, militias and pirate gangs around the oil wells, swamps and creeks leave hundreds dead every year. The region is home to vast oil reserves, which makes the country one of the world's biggest oil exporters. But unfortunately, oil, which could potentially have allowed Nigeria to be one of the wealthiest countries in Africa, has instead led it to become one of the poorest. Communities in the region have seen little benefit from the revenue derived from the export of oil. The region remains poor and under-developed.
The activities of large oil corporations such as Mobil, Chevron, Shell, Elf, Agip have raised many criticisms and concerns. Criticisms abound about the way the oil companies have neglected the surrounding environment and health of the local communities. Regular oil spills, blatant dumping of industrial wastes and promises of development projects that are not pursued through, have all contributed to the increasing environmental and health problems. The local populace has to suffer not only the adverse consequences of oil production and environmental degradation but also the deployment of abusive army and police units. They are locked in a cycle of extreme poverty, widespread unemployment, environmental pollution, and social injustice that has increasingly manifested itself in violent conflict. The Ogoni, Ijaw and other people in the Niger Delta, who have been the worst affected for decades, have been trying to stand up for themselves, their environment and their basic human and economic rights. And for decades the communities have been protesting against the injustices done by the federal Government and the oil multinationals, which in turn have responded by harshly cracking down on protesters.
Little has changed at present and oil remains the region's curse. Pipelines are regularly attacked by impoverished communities, which risk lives to siphon off fuel. Oil installations are also frequently targeted, which is estimated to result in thousands of crude oil wastage each year. Though the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDCC), set up in 2001 to redress decades of neglect suffered by the oil-rich region is gearing up to make its impact felt, the government has been implementing a policy of strengthening its military presence in the region. Key oil installations in the Delta region are under the protection of troops, a move aimed at ending the disruption of oil exports by the militant youths who have been siphoning oil from pipelines and attacking pumping stations, pipelines, loading points, export tankers, tank farms, and refined petroleum depots. However, the presence of troops has not led to the restoration of order, given that they are often outgunned by the militias. The spiral of violence has in fact intensified with militants opting for kidnapping expatriate oil workers and stealing crude oil from the pipelines, which is later sold in the black market for buying weapons to sustain the struggle. Easy availability of weapons has worsened the situation.
Analysts say the military can do little without parallel efforts to tackle the roots of the problem. Therefore, addressing the underlying causes of the conflict is more important than merely engaging in a confrontation by both the federal government and the oil multinationals. Even countries like India that have stakes in this region need to play a proactive role in restoring stability. Otherwise repeated attacks by aggrieved militant groups will disrupt oil production and oil supply.
As far as India is concerned any kind of instability leading to disruption in oil supply will jeopardize its interest. India imports over 10 million tonnes of crude oil and depends on 20 per cent of its oil imports from Nigeria. For the world too stability in the delta region is crucial, since Nigeria is the world's sixth largest oil exporter, producing 2.5 million dollars per day. Any disruption will have global economic implications. The recent violence has cut Nigeria's daily oil exports of 2.5 million by nearly 10 per cent and has also claimed at least 23 lives. As things stand, the insurgent groups in Nigeria's Delta region are a real threat to oil markets. If they were to carry out their threats, it would mean stoppage to an oil machine that pumps 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) of the world's production, which eventually may lead to increase in crude prices and the depressing of stocks around the world.
Russia's concern over Iran's nuclear programme is increasing with every passing day. Iranian authorities are showing un-willingness to accept Russia's proposal to enrich uranium in Russian territory. Russia is trying to resolve an international crisis over Iran's suspected nuclear weapons programme, though its position on Iran has rhetorically moved closer to the European "Troika" (France, Germany, UK). Russia agreed to Iran's referral to the UN Security Council on the condition that the council would take action only after the March 6 IAEA meeting. Iranian authorities are showing defiance and are not willing to listen to the rest of the world either. Russia is continuing its diplomatic efforts to persuade Iran to accept its proposal to come out of the present crisis.
Russia does not want Iran to become a new member of the nuclear weapons club. At the same time, it feels that sanctions will not help to persuade Iran to take note of international concerns, given that sanctions have not normally served the purpose and particularly in the case of Iran it is feared that imposition of sanctions is likely to harm the global oil prices. It is also feared that any such move is likely to result in creating even greater hatred toward the countries behind this decision and will strengthen the hardliners' grip on Iran. This will also hinder the effort of Iranian reformists to achieve their goals. At the same time, Tehran could also initiate or accelerate efforts to acquire the ultimate weapon as a deterrent, if not to use in retaliation at an opportune time. Further, with its vast petroleum assets and great authority, the Iranian regime may start doing what it is already accused of doing. In view of these repercussions, at present Russia's proposal looks to be the best option for both Iran and the rest of the world. Generally it is perceived that in case of failure of this Russian diplomatic effort, sanctions could emerge as the most viable decision for the global community, which is slated to meet on March 6 to further discuss the Iran nuclear issue.
There are economic and geopolitical interests behind Russia's soft stance on Iran. Geopolitically, Iran is Russia's biggest neighbour in the Caspian region, where Moscow is trying to restore its influence. Iran being Russia's neighbour, Russia would prefer to maintain friendly relations with it, particularly in view of Tehran's influence in Central Asia and Transcaucasus. Iran could resort to supporting terrorist activities within the Commonwealth of Independent States by providing Muslim insurgents with weapons, money and volunteers mainly in Chechnya and Tajikistan. It will therefore not be beneficial for Russia to antagonise Iran at present. Besides, Russia's other neighbours like Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia, which are also Iran's immediate neighbours, will also face difficulty if sanctions are imposed on Iran. Further, Russia could also resist the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and US influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asian region through a possible alliance with Iran. Therefore, from the strategic point of view, it is important for Russia to maintain friendly relations with Iran. It is because of Iran's importance that Teheran was given observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia will adopt a policy to support Iran rather than to go against it. Given that NATO's eastward expansion is already creating tension for Russia, the anti-Western regime in Iran would be natural ally for Russia. Thus the combination of economic incentives, strategic interests and Russia's desire to play an important role in the global decision making process might induce Kremlin to work towards finding a diplomatic way out of the crisis.
Russia is very clear in taking Iran's side, with which it has close economic and military partnerships. Russia-Iran relations have been strengthened by arms sale and the sale of nuclear power reactors to Iran in addition to the US$840 million reactor at Bushehr. Russia expects to achieve up to $10 billion from its Bushehr deal, though it is currently building the reactor on credit to be paid by Iran only after the completion of the project. Russia will also sell Iran an air-defence system known as the Tor-M1. The Tor-M1 uses a mobile launcher to track and destroy multiple targets. It is the largest weapons deal between Moscow and Tehran within the past five years. There are also energy ties between Iran and Russia. Russia's state-controlled Gazprom has invested up to $750 million in a number of energy projects in Iran. Russia also exports metals and machine manufacturing supplies to Iran worth about $2 billion a year. Russia has also launched a booster rocket carrying an Iranian satellite in October 2005 and there are further plans to launch a second Iranian satellite in the year 2007. Thus, any setback in Russia-Iran relations would impact on these commercial contracts and affect Russia's nuclear enterprises as well as its military-industrial complex.
Russia would like to see Iran as an important strategic and economic partner. Regarding Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran, it focuses exclusively on economic issues. Sanctions and admonitions will not change Russia's relation with Iran. Russia's present move also focused on its current policy towards Iran. Though at present Iran has not shown clear acceptance of the Russian proposal, Russia however feels that it has its own ways to persuade Iran, mainly through the supply of defensive weapons. As there are indications that Iran might need to protect its territory in the near future, particularly in the context of recent US pronouncements not ruling out the military option. Moreover, there are reports that Israel has drawn up plans for surgical strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities with bunker busting bombs supplied by the US. There are also reports that the Bush administration is preparing its NATO allies for a possible military strike against suspected nuclear sites in Iran. Nevertheless, in the backdrop of these realities Russia's intention will be to defend its own interest while helping Iran to solve the present crisis. Moscow is hoping to come out with an agreement with Iran on the uranium enrichment issue in Russian territory during the February 16 talks with Iran, which would cover a whole range of issues concerning the two countries.
Russia is now in a difficult position. On the one hand it is absolutely clear that a nuclear Iran is against its interests. In this respect, Russia's position is fully compatible with that of Western nations. On the other hand, if Moscow completely alienates Iran by siding with the West, the regime in Tehran could cause concern for Russia. One thing is clear to Russia: an isolated and nuclear Iran is certainly more dangerous than an Iran that is being engaged by the West and the international community. This consideration alone dictates that Russia keeps all lines of communication open and continues to maintain ties with its southern neighbour. While agreeing with the Western nations on nuclear non-proliferation, Russia would not like to lose its special geopolitical and economic ties with Iran. It is a difficult, but necessary, policy line for Russia, for it needs to take into account the short- and long-term consequences of any steps it takes on this issue.
In the post Yasser Arafat era, politics in the Gaza Strip is taking a completely different turn. For the last few years Ariel Sharon had taken a very tough stand against the militant group Hamas. However, now, particularly when Sharon is fighting for his life in the hospital, the Hamas's overwhelming victory in the Palestinian elections is likely to change the political dynamics of the region incalculably.
Many analysts see this victory not only as an end of corrupt Palestine Authority (PA) government but also as a direct challenge to the United States and Israel. Surprisingly, Hamas won a clear majority, capturing 76 of the 132 seats in parliament. Four independent candidates backed by Hamas also won. Fatah, which has dominated Palestinian political life since the 1960s but had in recent years alienated voters because of rampant corruption, obtained only 43 seats. The rest went to smaller parties.
One reason for the overwhelming victory of Hamas is a natural outgrowth of decades of abuse by Israel. For many years, while the Western media was only projecting the reprehensible suicide bombings by Hamas, this electoral victory clearly indicates its acceptability to the Palestinian masses. Though the rise of Hamas in Palestine politics has indeed been very violent, it has also played a crucial role in connecting with the masses through involvement in various social service activities.
Over the years many groups have been involved from the Palestine side in the struggle against Israel. Of these, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Hamas, and Hezbollah are the main groups.
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) is a radical Islamic organisation, which became active in the early stages of the Intifada (the mainstream Palestinian resistance movement which began in 1987). Though its primary area of operation was the Gaza Strip, it has also been active in the West Bank. Hamas has played a major role in violent fundamentalist subversion and radical terrorist operations against both Israelis and Arabs. Hamas is committed to a "holy war" for the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of an Islamic Palestine "from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River." Through its participation in street violence and murder, it boosted its appeal in the eyes of the Palestinians, which further enhanced its growth potential thus enabling it to play a central role in the Intifada. Because of its subversive and terrorist activity, Hamas was outlawed in September 1989. After the Gulf War, Hamas became the leading perpetrator of terrorist activity throughout the Occupied Territories as well as inside Israel.
The activities of Hamas mainly came to the forefront when it started opposing the Oslo peace accord between Israel and the PLO. In contrast to Hamas, PLO is not a fundamentalist group but the main secular, nationalist organisation of Palestinian politics. But during the last 20 years Israel has been forced to deal with both the PLO and Hamas mainly because of the asymmetric threat posed by the latter. Over the years Hamas's supporters have challenged the Palestinian national Authority, which was earlier led by Yasser Arafat. After the PLO and Israel signed a peace deal in 1993, Arafat founded the Palestinian Authority (PA), a new, Palestinian-led government for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. During the last few years, Hamas and PA have developed a love/hate relationship; sometimes they cooperate, sometimes they compete, and sometimes they clash. The recent defeat of PA and subsequent violence on the streets of Palestine clearly indicate the widening gap between these two major factions of the Palestinian movement.
This victory for Hamas is unique in many ways. Most importantly it has brought to power the most dreaded terrorist outfit but by democratic means. This has created difficulties not only to outside powers like the US, Israel and EU but also portends trouble to the Palestinian population. Given that the survival of the PA government was mainly dependent on funding from the West, none of these powers are likely to support a 'terrorist' government. This issue of Western funding is also critical for Hamas, which cannot otherwise raise resources to sustain itself in power and fulfil the people's socio-economic aspirations. And for this, it would have to renounce violence and its avowed position of "destroying Israel".
For India, Hamas's victory could be an eye-opener. In Jammu & Kashmir, some terrorist organizations enjoy a certain level of popular support though they have not yet deigned to test their electability. Hamas's victory could motivate them to test the electoral waters in future. India should understand the ramifications of such possibilities and remain prepared to deal with the situation as and when it arises.
Finally, Hamas's triumph is real bad news for the United States. If Washington wants to exert further pressure upon Hamas to disarm, its democracy agenda would end up looking rather weak and lacking in credibility. Also, the group's biggest backers, Iran and Syria, are likely to win some political capital simply by having backed the winners. And in the end the problems of the US's best friend Israel are far from over.
Two very important elections are set to take place in Israel and in the Palestinian territories - the Israeli Legislative Elections on March 28 and the Palestinian Parliamentary elections for the Legislative Council on January 25. Both events are beset with equal amounts of tension, confusion and turmoil, resulting in extremely strained run up to the elections.
Israel is bracing itself for an election in which the main contender, Ariel Sharon, will be unable to participate due to a sudden stroke, which has hurled Israeli politics in a pit of lingering uncertainty. Though Israelis are known for their resilience and are used to such uncertainties, the present situation is proving to be extremely arduous for them. Sharon, who had become a colossus in Israeli politics in the past few years, has been in the limelight ever since he decided to disengage from the Gaza Strip in mid-August 2004. The Disengagement Plan, which eventually resulted in rifts in the ruling Likud party, led to his resignation in December 2005 and pushed him to form a new centrist party called Kadima (Forward). His stroke and failing health have not only left Sharon but also the entire nation paralysed, presaging his departure from Israel's political scenario.
Who will succeed Sharon? What direction would Israel-Palestine relations take under a new leader? Will Sharon's exit from Israeli politics usher in an era of more hostility, more uncertainty or a combination of the two? Amongst these obscurities, one aspect is clear: Sharon's successor will not only have external problems to deal with but will primarily have to fill the vacuum created by his departure. The first on the list among Sharon's successors is the former Deputy Prime Minister and now acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who while temporarily replacing Sharon simultaneously faces the near-impossible demanding task of stepping into his shoes. Lacking the personal and political charisma that Sharon exuded, Olmert's main concern is about losing out to the hawkish Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu.
But recent polls conducted by Israeli newspapers Haaretz and Maariv found that Kadima, led by Olmert, could take 44 to 45 seats in Israel's 120-member parliament, its strongest showing so far. The polls also predicted that the centre-left Labour Party under Amir Peretz would get 16 to18, seats while the Likud led by Netanyahu would fall to third place with 13 to15 seats.
However, Israeli public opinion tends to undulate and the results of these polls can be attributed to the Israeli public's sympathy for Sharon and hence could subsequently change in course of time. As a majority of Israelis believed strongly in Sharon and saw him as the only leader who could take action suited to Israeli interests while at the same time placating the international community as well, it will take some time for them to accept a change in Israel's political leadership.
Thus, there are three political scenarios that can unfold after the coming elections. The first, as suggested by the polls, is the Kadima winning and Olmert becoming the Prime Minister. It is clear from Olmert's previous and present political actions that he will simply continue Sharon's political agenda. The second scenario could be Netanyahu taking over the leadership and subsequently implementing his hawkish policies. The third and most unlikely probability is the Labour leader Amir Peretz coming to power and reformulating the current political agenda, i.e. shifting the emphasis from security to socio-economic issues.
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Palestinians, on the other hand, are not without their share of turmoil, tension and challenges as they head towards elections this week. Even though the reasons for their predicament might differ from those of the Israelis, the rampant and raging sentiments felt by both have quite an uncanny resemblance. The main cause of concern here is the fear of outbreak of a civil war between the ruling Fatah party and the Islamic group Hamas. Hamas, which is participating for the first time in elections in the Occupied Territories, thrives not only on widespread grassroots support but has also benefited substantially from Fatah's incompetence and failure in governing and administering the territories efficiently. Fatah, which is ridden with corruption, nepotism and internal strife has lost considerable support amongst the Palestinians and is thus walking a tight rope in sustaining its credibility as the sole political force. It has to work extremely hard to revamp the party and vindicate itself as much as it can from corruption and internal problems. In addition, it faces internal divisions as the younger guard (who are also more radical) within the party registered their own list of candidates for the elections. Marwan Barghouti, who led the second Intifadaa and is currently serving a life sentence in an Israeli prison, heads the younger guard.
Hamas's popularity was clearly exhibited when it won a sweeping victory in the municipal elections in the West Bank in December 2005. The Palestinian electoral commission said that Hamas took 73 per cent of the vote in Nablus (the biggest city in the Occupied Territories), while the mainstream Fatah organisation obtained only 13 per cent. This clearly shows that Hamas has its roots strongly and deeply embedded in the West Bank as well as in the Gaza Strip and is all set to enter the Palestinian political establishment.
Fatah is not the only party that is deeply concerned about Hamas's popularity and decision to contest elections. Israel too shares the same sentiments and is highly skeptical of a terrorist group becoming part of the government. Hamas, which is on the list of terrorist organizations of many countries including that of the US, is being compelled by them to disarm and give up violence if it wants to become a legitimate political player. Hamas's decision to take part in the elections (it had refused to participate in the 1996 elections because of its opposition to the Oslo Accords) clearly represents a strategic rather than a mere tactical shift. Also, its recent decision to drop its call for Israel's destruction from its manifesto clearly indicates that it is serious about its future as a political player in Palestinian politics.
And by coupling their electoral participation with armed struggle, which it vows to continue against Israel, Hamas will create a major shift in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Thus, it is quite likely that a political infrastructure with Hamas, Fatah and smaller parties might be formed.
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However, an Israel without Sharon and a Palestine with Hamas could cause major changes not just in Israeli and Palestinian domestic politics but at the regional level as well. If Ehud Olmert wins and the Kadima comes to power then one would see the continuation of Sharon's unfinished political agenda. But if the hawkish Netanyahu - who strongly opposed Sharon's Disengagement and believes that Land can only be given to the Palestinians in exchange for Peace, which according to him the Israelis are not getting - comes to power than one is likely to witness stronger and more stringent measures imposed upon the Palestinians. Although the participation of Hamas has been troubling to some governments, most believe that their inclusion in the political process could lead to a softening of their hard line stance. Thus a Hamas versus Netanyahu scenario would be something neither the Israelis and Palestinians nor the Americans the international community would prefer. But it seems that such a scenario could become a reality soon, a reality for which Israel and the United States must get prepared for very soon.
On December 29, 2005, the Vietnamese foreign ministry accused Taiwan of being involved in the construction of a runway in the biggest of all of the islands, Itu Aba, in the disputed South China Sea. Also known as Taipingdao in Chinese, Ba Binh in Vietnamese and Ligaw in Filipino, it is strategically located in the region. Cumulatively, the South China Sea islands, covering about 200 islands and 800,000 square kilometres, are a bone of contention between Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines.
Vietnam accused Taiwan that its actions constitute "a severe violation of Vietnam's sovereignty, exerting negative impact on peace, stability and the trend of increasing cooperation in the region, countering the spirit of the Declaration of Conduct" between the ASEAN countries and China. However, Taiwan is not a signatory to the ASEAN-China declaration of 2002 on the South China Sea, although it has identical views with China on the dispute as a whole. While the contracting parties to the Declaration avoided the inclusion of Taiwan because of Chinese sensitivities and also due to their own varying "one China" policies, the incident could also be construed as a chance for Taiwan to test political waters in South China Sea.
This incident comes as a surprise since both Taiwan and Vietnam have shown some flexibility in their relations of late. Taiwan, for instance, has launched the "Go South" policy of gradually shifting economic investments from the China market towards the ASEAN countries, given political and military tensions with China. Several thousands of Vietnamese, Filipinos, Thais and others work in Taiwan and are increasingly intermarrying into Taiwanese society, although visa related issues are increasingly threatening Taiwan-ASEAN relations.
Nevertheless, internally, Taiwan is politically divided on how to tackle the incident as the Legislative Yuan is currently debating on the runway issue. With high level political leaders' visits to China, including that of opposition leaders Lien Chen and James Soong, further political divisions between the political parties is expected in Taiwan on this issue. Reportedly, the pro-unification parties like the Kuomintang are opposed to the construction of the runway, while the Taiwan identity parties like the ruling Democratic Progressive Party wish to chart a fresh course. Indeed, it was reported that President Chen Shui-bian wanted to visit Itu Aba some time ago. He had visited offshore islands like Penghu in 2004.
In November 1946, the Nationalist Kuomintang government in China erected sovereignty marks on Itu Aba after sending naval ships to the region. Subsequently, a Republic of China Army Garrison with about 400 soldiers came into being and under the control of Taiwan from 1956. The garrison looked after the maintenance and military installations of the island. In 2000, the Taiwanese Coast Guard, with 200 personnel, took over the island from the Taiwanese Army. It has plans to build the runway to reportedly accommodate transports like the C-130. The main objectives of the Coast Guard appear to be to conduct effective search and rescue operations and for oceanic environmental protection, although the Taiwanese deputy defence minister suggested on January 5, 2006 that it is for "strategic purpose". While an estimated one-third of the more than one kilometre of the runway is reportedly complete, it would be difficult to imagine whether fighter aircraft can land on the 1.3 kilometre long island. That means the Taiwanese air force will be unable to launch any long-range aviation activities in the region, which is made further difficult by the fact that it lacks any credible midair-refuelling facilities or assets.
For Vietnam, while its relations with China are normalising, the South China dispute is still a challenging proposition. After the 1974 Chinese occupation of some islands in the Paracels portion of the South China Sea, Vietnam's relations with China deteriorated, leading to the 1979 border clashes. Vietnam appears to be caught between the "concessions" it made to China on the Taiwan issue and the South China Sea dispute, in addition to the overall role of China in the region. Vietnam has by and large followed a pro-China policy on the Taiwan issue. On May 19, 2004, for instance, Vietnam stated that it "completely supports China's policy on the Taiwan issue" and reunification efforts. In the backdrop of the anti-secession law passed by the Chinese National People's Congress, Vietnam declared on March 16, 2005 that it "persistently pursue[d] the "one-China policy. Taiwan is a part of China. Vietnam protests Taiwan's activities for independence". However, Vietnam has maintained that it is inclined to support peaceful efforts in resolving the Straits issue.
On the dispute itself, Vietnam and others have concluded several bilateral and multilateral agreements. At the bilateral level, Vietnam and China have signed the Agreement on Delimitation of the Tonkin Gulf, the Vietnam-China Fishery Cooperation Agreement and several political agreements by visiting high-level leaders of the two countries. At the multilateral level, as the disputants to the South China Sea are about six, several arrangements and agreements have been made, including conforming to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. On March 14, 2005, Vietnam, the Philippines and China signed a further agreement at Manila for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea by Vietnam's Oil and Gas Corporation, the Philippine's National Oil Company and China's National Offshore Oil Corporation.
However, despite these agreements, in actual practice, there have been several incidents in the area that have threatened to derail relations between China and others in the region, specifically with Vietnam and the Philippines. Given the potential energy resources in the region, drilling contracts and disputes have come to the fore. Vietnam protested the presence of the Chinese oil-drilling platform Kantan 3, which was hauled by Nanhai No. 215 vessel from Shanghai into the exclusive economic zone close to Vietnam between November 19 and December 31, 2004. On January 8, 2005, the Chinese naval patrol police shot dead or captured several Vietnamese fishermen in the western side of the Gulf of Tonkin. The Filipino Navy, likewise, frequently complains about Chinese naval intrusions and build-up in the region.
For China, its carefully crafted, but non-binding, declaration of 2002 is coming under closer scrutiny even as its efforts to isolate Taiwan among ASEAN countries may be limited with the current developments about Itu Aba. While Vietnam and the Philippines preferred a binding Code of Conduct for disputants in South China Sea, China has succeeded, through its "friends" in ASEAN, to settle for a flexible declaration. However, unilateral Chinese oil drilling activities and naval build-up question its "responsible" rise in the region.
Simmering discontent in the region on the South China Sea dispute should concern India as the region straddles its burgeoning trade and investment destinations, increasing interactions with several countries and energy and merchandise flows. Motivated by these considerations, the Indian Navy has conducted operations in the region with friendly countries and has helped enhance security of the sea lines of communications, although it has not sided with any of the disputants in the region.
Balochistan has once again flared up, as troops moved in on December 18, 2005 to discipline the recalcitrant Marri tribes in Kohlu district. By commencing its much-awaited operations in Balochistan, the Pakistan military broke a tenuous peace that had lasted for nine months since clashes in Dera Bugti had claimed over 60 lives. The present operations in Balochistan ostensibly started in response to the December 14 rocket attacks on Kohlu town during President Pervez Musharraf's visit to lay the foundation stone of one of the three new cantonments to be set up in the province. Baloch nationalists fiercely oppose the cantonments. The very next day an Army helicopter that was carrying the Inspector-General, Frontier Corps (IGFC), Maj-Gen Shujaat Zamir Dar and his deputy Brig Saleem Nawaz was shot at by machine-gun fire. Though the pilot succeeded in safely landing the helicopter, both officers sustained bullet injuries.
Islamabad's sharp reaction to innocuous Indian remarks asking it to exercise restraint while dealing with its own population in Balochistan has clearly exhibited Pakistan's sensitivity in Balochistan, which has been its Achilles heel. Spread over an area of 147,000 square miles, Balochistan comprises 43 per cent of Pakistan's land mass but has only five per cent of its population. It also has immense natural resources and most of Pakistan's energy resources. Its location astride the oil lanes of the Persian Gulf, as well as at the trijunction where Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan meet makes it geopolitically and strategically the most important part of Pakistan. It nearly commands the country's entire coast - 470 miles of the Arabian Sea. It is a land that is ruled autocratically by feudal lords. Historically, it has been a loose tribal confederacy, which owed allegiance to the Persian emperor and the Afghan kings at different times in history. The ethnic origins of the Baloch set them distinctly apart from the peoples of the Indo-Gangetic plains.
Four times since Pakistan's creation, the Baloch (who like many Sindhis and Pakhtoons never wanted to be part of Pakistan) have rebelled demanding greater autonomy or even an independent state, which would reunite the five million Baloch in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan under one flag. The Khan of Kalat, the acknowledged liege lord of all Baloch tribes, had sought a status similar to that of Nepal during the British Raj. After independence both houses of parliament in Kalat had unanimously rejected the proposal to merge with Pakistan. Yet, British Balochistan was merged with Pakistan and the municipality of Quetta, a body overwhelmingly dominated by non-Baloch settlers, ratified the proposal. Subsequently, the Khan of Kalat was forced to sign the merger document and Kalat was annexed. This led to the first armed insurgency in 1948 led by Prince Karim, the brother of the Khan.
Between then and now, the Baloch have risen in revolt thrice and have faced the Pakistani security forces in 1958, 1963-69 and 1973-77. Each of these uprisings were crushed with brute force and left psychological scars that are yet to heal. The organizational capabilities of the insurgents and popular support for them have increased with every insurgency. At the peak of its intensity in 1973, 55000 insurgents faced 80000 Pakistani troops; the latter were supported not only by the Pakistani Air Force but by the Iranian Air force as well. More than 5000 insurgents and over 3300 soldiers are believed to have been killed in the conflict that lasted till 1977. Pakistani Armed Forces, which had lost Bangladesh a few years earlier, used a heavy hand to crush the Baloch insurgency to redeem their honour.
Though the current operations have ostensibly been launched against Marri tribesmen in Kohlu district for their suspected involvement in rocket attacks and bomb explosions, a careful analysis of events would indicate that the operation had been planned much before any of these incidents took place. In fact, the operation had been planned for in October 2005 but was delayed because of the earthquake that hit Pakistan on October 8, 2005.
After originating in Kohlu district, the conflict has engulfed the neighbouring Dera Bugti district as well. Security forces supported by helicopter gunships and artillery have been targeting Baloch strongholds. The current operation is a full-fledged military offensive against Baloch nationalists. Bugti and Marri, two large, influential, but rival tribes in Balochistan, are now pitted against the government and are demanding more autonomy for the province, a bigger share in national resources and a special quota in federal jobs, besides enhanced royalty for natural gas, which is supplied to the whole country from the Sui region of Balochistan.
The insurgents appear to be well versed in military craft and realize that they are in no position to take on the security forces in direct combat. They are therefore targeting communication links to delink Balochistan from the rest of Pakistan. Their targets include railway lines, gas pipelines, and electricity and communication towers. They have even gone out of the state and targeted pipelines and bridges. They also seem to be familiar with the art of psychological operations and their representatives have also been quick to take credit for various acts of sabotage.
The situation is reported to be worsening, with large-scale collateral damage. Baloch nationalists have claimed that indiscriminate firing by the security forces has led to large-scale death and destruction. A number of women and children have been killed. Opposition parties in parliament have accused the government of carrying out genocide by employing helicopters in bombing sorties and using poisonous phosphorus gas against the population. Human rights activists have been prevented from visiting the affected districts. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has urged the government to stop killing Balochis in Kohlu and to cease fire immediately. It has recommended that the issue be resolved politically.
The current insurgency in Balochistan underlines the fragility of the Pakistani State more than 58 years after its creation. The regional aspirations of various ethnic groups and their efforts to assert their sub-national identities poses a potent threat to the Pakistani State. With the exception of Punjabis, other groups perceive themselves as Pakhtoons, Balochs, Sindhis or Mohajirs first and Pakistanis later. These other groups also suffer from a persecution complex and feel that they are being discriminated against by the Punjabi elite. In nearly six decades of Pakistan's existence, the Baloch have always been out of the mainstream. This is the why, whilst Pakhtoons assimilated in Pakistani society with the passage of time, the Balochs have moved away.
At Partition, the tribal areas of Balochistan were amongst the most backward parts of the subcontinent. Almost six decades later, they are still in the same condition. The tribesmen may be carrying automatic Kalashnikov assault rifles instead of ancient Lee Enfield 303s; that apart, there has hardly been any progress or development. The only law is the one laid down by the tribal chief. Clearly, the existence of such pockets of lawless lands has helped in the spread of anarchy in Pakistan. Since the Afghan war, guns and drugs have flooded Pakistan and the use of missiles, anti-aircraft weapons and an array of modern and very lethal arms by the Baloch in the current conflict is indicative of this. The army has suffered serious casualties in its operations, and has been forced to use helicopter gunships to quell the rebellion.
The record of the Pakistan Army in dealing with internal disorders has actually been dismal. Its operations in the East led to the creation of Bangladesh. Its operations in Sindh and Balochistan have failed to integrate the restive population despite the use of brute force. Recent operations in FATA have also tied down almost an entire division supported liberally by artillery and helicopter gunships. But militants still roam the region with impunity. In fact, the alienation of the population has only grown with the passage of time. The security forces have also managed to create a perpetual problem in the tranquil heights of the Northern Areas. The security apparatus in Pakistan at this point of time is really overstretched and if violence in Balochistan intensifies, the Pakistan army will definitely be sucked into a quagmire from which it will find it extremely difficult to extricate. The sands of Balochistan have the potential to fester and bleed Pakistan.
At the end of 2005, China became the world's sixth largest economy if one were to look at the size of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) alone. China 's GDP was estimated to be 15.99 trillion renminbi (RMB) i.e., around USD 1.98 trillion. It now follows the United States , Japan , Germany , Britain and France in GDP terms and is expected to emerge the fourth largest economy before the end of 2006.
It is not unusual for countries with rapid growth to witness major revisions in their GDP. In many countries around the world, the introduction of better methods of accounting such as the 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA) brought about significant revisions in GDP. For instance, in Denmark , the introduction of the 1993 SNA resulted in an upward revision of the 1996 GDP by 7.4 per cent. According to the World Bank, the order of magnitude of China 's revision is by no means an exception, and revisions tend to be larger for countries that grow faster. The reason behind this logic is that the many new enterprises that are established in dynamic economies are only 'imperfectly captured' by the prevalent statistical system. Moreover, surveys to determine GDP tend to under-represent rapidly growing enterprises. Other recent examples of an increased in GDP have been Indonesia , where a 2004 revision resulted in a 17 per cent increase in GDP; and Norway , where a 1995 revision resulted in an increase of some 11 per cent in measured GDP.
Statistics and the Chinese economy
On December 20, 2005 , China 's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) announced that following the nation's first countrywide economic census it was 'discovered' that China 's GDP had been understated by around USD 296 billion. This figure is equivalent to 17.5 per cent of the GDP for 2004. To quote Li Deshui, Director of China's National Bureau of Statistics, "these new figures give us a clearer and a better way of understanding China 's economy." Using the 'trend deviation method' -- widely adopted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) -- most of the extra output discovered was in the services sector, which the statistical apparatus had earlier neglected to estimate. Prior to this economic census, China 's statisticians used to employ the Material Product System (MPS) developed under the centrally planned economic system, to arrive at an estimate of the economy.
After the revelation by the NBS, the ratio of the service sector to GDP in 2004 rose from 31.9 per cent to 40.7 per cent. The service sector's output was revised to 6.5 trillion RMB (US$785 billion) from the previous estimate of 4.4 trillion RMB (US$531.4 billion). Significantly, the ratio of manufacturing and construction fell to 46.2 per cent from 52.9 per cent, and the share of agriculture shrank to 13.1 per cent from 15.2 per cent. The general reaction to the upward estimates of China 's GDP have been favourable. Bert Hoffman, chief of the economics unit of the World Bank Office in Beijing , said that the data provides "better information on the current status of China 's economy as well as on structural issues such as the sectoral shares of the economy." The new data is also considered very timely and will benefit the implementation of the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-10).
The NBS raised its estimates of GDP growth for every year but one during the period 1993-2004, meaning that China 's buoyant economy has been growing even more rapidly, sometimes at rates above 10 per cent. To some extent this vindicates the views of many independent economists who believed that China's true economic growth over the past several years has been substantially understated by official figures (although, equally, it is strange that the NBS has revised upwards GDP growth for 1999 and 2000, given the widely held view that GDP growth at the time was in fact lower than official estimates). The figures also mean that China 's rates of exports and investment are smaller as a percentage of the total economy, easing the fears of many analysts that they were unsustainably high.
Among the most eye-catching revisions are those to GDP growth in 2004 and 2003. Real GDP in 2004 was raised to 10.1 per cent from 9.5 per cent previously, and similarly that for 2003 has been raised to 10 per cent from 9.5 per cent. In the 12 years covered by the revisions, only the GDP growth figure for 1998 -- the year of the Asian financial crisis -- has remained unchanged, at 7.8 per cent. Back in 1993, at the height of China 's previous economic boom, the economy is now seen as having grown by 14 per cent (up from 13.5 per cent previously). As a result of the latest changes, the NBS says the country's average annual rate of GDP growth since 1979 is 9.6 per cent, which it says represents an increase of 0.2 percentage points.
Rationalising China 's economic growth
Interestingly, two arguments central to China 's GDP revision are now doing the rounds. The first argues that China had deliberately falsified its economic performance data prior to its accession to the WTO in December 2001. In the long drawn process that preceded China joining the WTO (formerly the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) since 1986, trade negotiators had to decide whether China was to be entitled to "developing country" status as a WTO Member. Ordinarily, this status is self-designated by WTO Members based on factors such as relative GDP per capita. A developing country status entitles a Member to take advantage of transition periods for implementing various WTO Agreement obligations, and it reduces the level of trade concessions that the Member is expected to make in negotiations. China 's trade officials asserted that it was a "developing country" and secured concessions of a transitory nature that stretch to twelve years from the date of accession. Article 15 of the document on China 's accession to the WTO conditionally defines China as a "non-market economy country." In other words, China will be considered a market economy not before 2013, despite the fact that its trading volumes are estimated to be around 60 per cent of GDP currently.
The second argument is that China is indeed bringing its financial statements and data to international levels of conformity and that the system is becoming more transparent. Lack of an independent national statistics agency, in this view, was the major reason behind the unreliability of economic statistics, as local authorities tended to 'massage' statistics to advance their careers within the Party. The upward revision of the GDP is an instance of China 's confidence and adaptability to a more globalised world. The government said that exports in 2005 were a record $762 billion, up 28 per cent, while imports climbed to $660 billion, up nearly 18 per cent. Total foreign trade topped USD 1.4 trillion, making China the world's third largest foreign trader after the United States and Germany by overtaking Japan . China 's trade surplus with the rest of the world tripled in 2005 to a record $102 billion, a figure that could reignite global trade frictions and also step up pressure on China to allow its currency to appreciate further.
Conclusion
For the 'fourth generation leadership' represented by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the first national economic census is an endeavour that portrays the functioning of government bureaus in a transparent and responsible manner. The importance attached to the economic census can be gauged by the fact that the entire exercise took place under the directives of the State Council. The survey's leading group was headed by Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan, with provincial and local governments at all levels as well as concerned departments participating in the event. More than three million enumerators and supervisors were recruited, and another 10 million statisticians and accountants from government agencies, enterprises and institutions were mobilised to participate in the survey. The survey is also an indicator to the outside world that China is willing to adhere and adopt international standards of estimating national income, which will undoubtedly put to rest constant complaints about the statistics that China generates.
The dispute over the price hike for Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine was settled on January 4, 2006 , when Russian energy giant Gazprom and Ukraine 's state oil and gas company Naftogaz reached an agreement on the supply of Russian natural gas to Ukraine through a joint-venture company Rosukrenergo. It focused international attention on Russia 's current policy shift and the mechanisms of its implementation. Russia 's cut-off of gas supplies and increasing manifestations of a more assertive policy towards Ukraine were mainly intended to limit Ukraine 's pro-Western foreign policy orientation and its European aspirations.
Russia has the largest natural gas reserves, with 1,700 trillion cubic feet of the fuel or 27 per cent of the world's total. Ukraine consumed about 80 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 2004-05, of which some 20 billion was domestically produced and roughly 36 billion bought from Turkmenistan . It received approximately 17 billion from Russia in lieu of payment for transporting Russian gas to Europe and purchased the rest (6-7 billion cubic meters) from Moscow . Ukraine is the fourth largest importer and sixth largest consumer of natural gas in the world. The dispute between Ukraine and Russia reached the crisis point during January 1-3, 2006 . More importantly, it was not merely limited to these two countries alone, but also threatened long-term repercussions for Europe . The dispute arose when Ukraine refused to agree to a fourfold hike in the price for deliveries in 2006 at the rate of $230 per 1,000 cu m, i.e. more than four times the price charged in 2005. It considered this hike as economically unreasonable and politically charged. But Russia claimed that Gazprom's subsidies to the Ukrainian economy amounted to billions of dollars and that Ukraine should pay the market price.
Gazprom began reducing pressure in the natural gas pipeline to Ukraine on January 1, and cut supplies by 120 million cubic meters a day, though deliveries to Europe continued. Nonetheless, this led to a disruption of imports across Europe. Several European countries reported shortfalls in the gas flow from January 1. Europe receives about a quarter of its gas from Russia , with some 80 per cent of it coming in pipelines across Ukraine . Russian gas goes to West European countries like Germany , Italy , France , Austria as well as to a number of Central & East European countries like Poland , Hungary , Romania , Slovakia , Slovenia , Bulgaria and Croatia . This crisis demonstrated not only Ukraine 's but also Europe 's dependency on Russian gas supplies. European countries are also now becoming concerned about being overly dependent on Russian gas supplies. The European Union has even thought of asking for more gas from other suppliers like Norway and the Netherlands to safeguard supplies to industrial consumers. The EU has also started thinking of following in Finland 's footsteps, which is moving ahead with plans to build the world's largest nuclear reactor to lessen its reliance on Russian gas. Germany, which has close ties with Russia and has generally been viewed as being in a secure position as far as oil and gas supplies are concerned, has also became cautioned and is considering alternative transport routes, viz., an additional route from the North European Gas Pipeline, which will link the massive Russian gas fields with Germany under the Baltic Sea. By using this route Germany and Europe would achieve considerable independence and would not get affected by political instability in the neighbourhood.
Though Russia suspended gas supplies to Ukraine , it expected the latter to ensure un-interrupted natural gas transit via its territory to European Union countries in line with its international obligations and take every measure to prevent gas flows to Europe being tapped. During the course of the dispute, Gazprom blamed Ukraine for siphoning off 118.7 million cu m of Russian export gas as well as of stealing 104.8 million cu m of Russian export gas. But Naftogaz contended that it was the cut-off in Russian gas supplies that resulted in the reduction of deliveries to Europe . Ukraine moreover claimed that it was only using Turkmen gas when Russia cut off gas supplies.
This move by Russia to increase gas prices during the winter season may have gained some popularity for its President at home but its reputation as a reliable natural gas supplier has been compromised. The Russian action was a reflection of its goal of using energy supplies as a tool to control and maintain its influence in the region, though Moscow has strongly rejected allegations of any political motives behind the gas price hike and stoppage. Ukraine , however, has questioned the favouritism shown by Russia towards other former Soviet republics, which continue to pay much lower prices. Armenia , Georgia and the Baltic States will pay $110-125 per 1,000 cubic meters in 2006, while Russia 's closest ally Belarus will pay only $47 per 1,000 cubic meters. This could be because Belarus has signed over 100 per cent ownership of its pipeline network to Russia, while the Baltic states have permitted Russia to own significant stakes in their domestic energy systems including the pipeline networks, which has not been the case with Ukraine.
Under the new deal, which is valid for five years, Gazprom has agreed to sell gas to the Rosukrenergo trading company for $230 per 1,000 cubic meters and Ukraine has agreed to buy gas from Rosukrenergo for $95. The two companies have also agreed to raise the transit fee that Gazprom pays to send gas through Ukrainian pipelines from $1.09 to $1.60 per 1,000 cubic metres. The new deal with Ukraine is quite favourable to Russia . It ensures greater say for Moscow in Ukraine 's foreign policy orientation. Moreover, it has brought to an end the old barter system, which Moscow has been intent on doing away with for some time now. This would also make it more attractive for foreign investors - who have been averse to the barter system - to buy minority stakes in Russia 's oil and gas sector, thus further boosting Moscow 's overall market share of energy resources. In contrast, Ukraine was wracked by internal political upheaval within a week of the new agreement. Fuelled by widespread apprehensions that the deal would prove to be economically damaging and provide too much leverage to Moscow , the Supreme Rada ( Ukraine 's Parliament) voted on January 10 to dismiss the government.
While the agreement will ensure stable gas supplies to Ukraine as well as to Europe , the dispute demonstrates the dangers of dependence. A similar turn of events in future could force price hikes across Europe and as a fallout in Asia as well. The dispute caused considerable concern in Europe about the future of secure energy supplies and the dangers of relying upon Russia . The shock caused by the Russia-Ukraine dispute could well act as a trigger for a restructuring of European energy policy.
The most plausible explanation for Russia 's action is its concern about Kiev 's pro-Western stance and the loss of political influence in Western and Central Ukraine . Additionally, through this move, Moscow can also be said to have tried to demonstrate to other former Soviet republics its capability and desire to play big brother and maintain its hegemony in the region. Another aspect that lends weight to this argument is Russia 's offer to Ukraine during the course of the dispute a $3.6 billion loan to finance gas imports during 2006. Kiev turned this offer down to avoid assuming further obligations towards Russia . Moreover, Moscow 's tough action, which began on the day Russia assumed the chairmanship of the Group of Eight, also seems to have been intended as a demonstration of its major power status. As the G8 focuses on energy security, Russia has shown where the balance of power lies. It does not merely wish to win friends with its energy potential but is intent on buying influence as well.
The Indian-led United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE), which is monitoring the five-year-old ceasefire between the two countries, is in danger of being withdrawn due to escalation in tensions. Eritrea has imposed restrictions on the movement of UNMEE personnel and has made its functioning almost impossible. The fragile peace maintained by Ethiopia and Eritrea since signing a comprehensive agreement at Algiers in December 2000 seems set to end. Tensions have grown in recent weeks with military build-ups on both sides of the border, raising fears of a repeat of their 1998-2000 border war. Though neither side appears eager for war, growing bilateral tensions cannot be dismissed lightly either. A resumption of conflict will not only have a devastating impact on these two countries but could destabilize the entire Horn of Africa region by fuelling flows of small arms to armed groups, rekindling a proxy war in Somalia and jeopardizing the peace process in Sudan.
After a costly war and five years of stalemate, patience on both the sides of the border has worn thin. The problem arose in the wake of the July 2002 ruling of the independent Boundary Commission, which was established to delimit and demarcate the contested border. It awarded the small border settlement of 'Badme' (the primary bone of contention) to Eritrea , which Ethiopia has found unacceptable. Consequently, Ethiopia has been seeking a revision of the award, though both countries had agreed in advance that the Commission's decision would be final and binding. This is the root of the stalemate that has brought the two countries back to the brink of war.
After seeking revision of the boundary award for three years, Ethiopia , in an October 2005 letter to the UN Security Council, emphasized its eagerness to engage Eritrea in a dialogue for a win-win outcome that is consistent with sustainable peace. But Eritrea saw this offer as a delaying tactic and demanded the full demarcation of the border before any dialogue began.
Apparently frustrated by the stalemate and the belief that the international community is biased towards Ethiopia , Eritrea has targeted UNMEE, which monitors the demilitarised Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) along the border. The restrictions imposed have meant that UNMEE can monitor only 60 per cent of the border, which it moreover asserts is "tense and potentially volatile." Eritrea has also demanded that UNMEE staff drawn from Western countries should leave.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his recent report to the Security Council has said that as a result of the restrictions imposed on UNMEE, its position is becoming increasingly untenable and that the time may be fast approaching to take difficult decisions on the Mission 's future. The report outlines six options for the Security Council's consideration ranging from maintenance of the status quo to full withdrawal of UN troops altogether. Annan said that UNMEE could buy time "for diplomatic initiatives to unblock the current dangerous stalemate," or opt for relocation, moving most of the UN staff now in Asmara to Addis Ababa . While making it clear that none of the options was perfect, Annan said that both sides would still have to fully implement UNSC Resolution 1640 passed on November 23, 2005 . The resolution threatened actions, possibly including sanctions, against both countries if, in the case of Eritrea it does not immediately rescind its flight ban, and against both parties if they do not reverse their military build-up.
Annan has asked the Security Council to impose a deadline by which the two countries would have to meet its demands. He has warned that if the parties do not fully commit and cooperate, not only the future of the mission but also the continuation of the peace process between the two nations would be called into question. He has also added that dialogue between the two parties should resume without any precondition and in good faith.
In fact it is the absence of dialogue and the military build-up on both sides of the frontier that has fuelled the friction. To avert this present warlike situation, a dialogue is necessary and before that de-escalation of political and military tensions is essential to bring about an environment favourable for dialogue. This essentially requires both countries to comply with Resolution 1640. Ethiopia has shown certain positive gestures by withdrawing some of its troops, but Eritrea has persisted with its demands.
As for the UNMEE mission, it is apparent that the world body is avoiding a hasty decision on its future. In the January 9, 2006 Council meeting, Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno stated that there is a sense of urgency and that the status quo is unsustainable. But at the same time he also pointed out that there is a recognition that one should not rush to precipitous decisions. In his view, time has to be given for diplomacy to work. Mr. Guéhenno further added that the troop contributing countries were aware that a decision to withdraw could have "momentous consequences," though at some point tough decisions would have to be made if developments did not go the way they should.
As far as India is concerned, the Indian Mission to the United Nations in New York has not commented on the options given by Annan though Indian Ambassador Nirupam Sen had told a meeting of the Security Council in October 2005 that UNMEE would collapse unless the UNSC took a decisive decision. India has expressed concern about the safety and security of its peacekeepers, as the helicopter ban has complicated urgent evacuations for injured UNMEE troops who must now be taken by ambulance over treacherous roads for medical treatment.
According to the UNMEE spokesperson Gail Bindley Taylor-Sainte, the UN Secretary General has appealed to both India and Jordan to give some time for the resolution of the issue. She added that the situation would become serious if India and Jordan were to withdraw. Currently the two nations provide about 2000 of UNMEE's nearly 3300 troops. Major General Rajender Singh of India heads the mission.
In the present situation UNMEE has been almost immobilized. Its efficiency has degraded by more than 55 per cent in terms of surveillance, logistics, safety and evacuation capability necessary in view of ongoing de-mining operations and also to airlift the sick and the injured. If Eritrea continues with its restrictions, it would jeopardize the integrity of the mission and the safety of the troops. If the environment were to turn hostile and the mission's purpose gets defeated, India could think of pulling its peacekeeping troops out instead of placing their lives at risk. For its part, the Security Council needs to deal with Eritrea 's attempts to restrict UNMEE while at the same time focusing on the larger issue that is driving the conflict, viz., the boundary dispute. Re-engagement by the Algiers Group (AU, EU, UN, and US), which witnessed the June 2000 Peace agreement, is urgently required to calm the immediate crisis and move the peace process into implementation phase. If peace is to be preserved, both defusing the present crisis and addressing the root causes of the problem have to proceed in tandem.
